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BOOK REVIEWS
URBAN INCENTIVE TAX CREDITS. By Edward M. Meyers and John J.
Musial. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974. Pp. xiv, 142. $15.00.
Ever since Americans realized that there was an urban crisis
there has been no shortage of ideas and programs calculated to solve
it. Each analysis of our urban ills has forcefully demonstrated that
many of our central cities are suffering a decline in industrial base,
a loss of jobs, an outmigration of the upwardly mobile to the sub-
urbs, massive inmigration of the rural poor, vehicular strangulation,
and an inability of government at any level to provide the resources
and leadership necessary to extricate us from this great morass.
What is needed, we are continually told, is a comprehensive ap-
proach to rebuild and revitalize the cities. In Urban Incentive Tax
Credits, Edward M. Meyers' and John J. Musial l offer us still an-
other strategy to deal with the urban crisis: federal income tax
credits for individuals and businesses located within the boundaries
of central cities.
Decades and billions of dollars spent in treating urban problems
have yielded one failure after another. The earliest programs consis-
ted primarily of slum clearance and urban renewal. They were based
on the assumption that razing the slums and replacing them with
new housing or cultural and civic facilities would bring the middle
class back to the city. Downtown businesses would prosper, the
municipal tax base increase, and the city would undergo a renais-
sance. The actual consequence of massive urban renewal was to
spread the slums, remove many properties from the tax rolls, leave
vacant vast areas of the central cities, and increase racial tensions.
The Model Cities and War on Poverty programs were designed to
defuse the urban-racial crisis by revitalizing communities through
neighborhood planning involving the poor, improved delivery of
1. Mr. Meyers is presently Principal Planner with the University of
California system and formerly a social planner with the City of Detroit's
City Plan Commission, Social Planning Division.
2. Mr. Musial is presently Head Social Planner for the City of Detroit's
City Plan Commission and Vice-President of Shiefman and Associates,
Inc., a marketing research firm.
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services, and massive federal aid to those individuals and areas
most desperately in need. These programs floundered in competi-
tion with military expenditures and in the conflicts between neigh-
borhoods and municipal governments. Most of the benefits were
apparently received by the antipoverty professionals and bureau-
crats. The poor continued in a state of dependency.'
The most recent and widely heralded approach is the concept of
the New Federalism, whereby the national government shares its
moderately progressive and ever-growing tax base with state and
local governments. In principle, this program enables local govern-
ments partially to escape their tax limitations and to provide im-
proved services to residents and the business community. Support-
ers hoped these additional funds would allow cities the resources
needed to cope with the multitude of problems confronting them.
Because of the niggardly sums appropriated, revenue sharing has
not met these expectations. Distribution formulas which favor sub-
urban areas and a failure to provide for citizen participation in the
allocation of these additional funds also hamper the program's
effectiveness. As a result, it is possible that the cities will actually
end up with less federal aid under revenue sharing than under pre-
vious funding arrangements.4
Meyers and Musial fully recognize that each of these federal
programs has failed to stem the tide of urban decay. As a starting
point for their own analysis, they set out to discover the elements
of those federal programs which they considered to be successful.
These include the investment tax credit, farm subsidies, and tax
deductions for home ownership and charitable contributions. The
authors attribute the success of these programs to: (1) "a relatively
small governmental expenditure . . . introduced into the market
system to influence the actions of targeted individuals and groups
toward socially desirable ends;"5 (2) avoidance of "excessive admin-
istrative overhead or 'red tape' found in programmatic attempts at
solutions;"' and (3) lack of any need for the implementation of
3. E. MEYERS & J. MUSIAL, URBAN INCENTIVE TAX CREDITS-A SELF-
CORRECTING STRATEGY TO REBUILD CENTRAL CITIES 54 (1974).
4. Id. at 66-69.
5. Id. at 71.
6. Id.
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"complex and sophisticated sociological theory."7 In other words,
successful federal programs use the signals generated by the market
mechanism to induce individuals and businesses to behave in a
socially desirable manner.
The authors attempt to incorporate these lessons in their proposal
which provides a tax credit to all individuals and businesses who
reside within depressed central cities. Such a credit is designed to
reverse the exodus of middle and upper income individuals from the
central cities and induce businesses to undertake new investment
within the city. This infusion of new people, economic activity, and
tax refund money would itself generate a ripple effect on jobs and
incomes. The tax burden of the overtaxed city resident would be
substantially eased and the municipal tax base would be strength-
ened. Another consequence of an increase of middle and upper in-
come residents will be to force local governments to tackle the severe
problems of their inadequate educational systems and decaying in-
frastructure. The end result will be to push the cities into self re-
newal, help break the poverty circle, and begin the elimination of
the disparities between cities and their suburbs.
The authors suggest several possible alternative formulas for de-
termining the amount of tax credit for each city. They favor one
based on the socio-economic differences 8 between the central city
and the remainder of its metropolitan area. Adjustments might be
allowed for local tax effort, crime rates, amount of tax exempt prop-
erty, and so on. They estimate that their optimal proposal would
yield an average sixteen percent credit on personal income taxes and
eight percent on corporate profits taxes with a total cost of approxi-
mately $6.22 billion per year. Unlike most federal programs, how-
ever, this expenditure would phase itself out as incomes and socio-
economic scores9 of city and suburb gradually equalize. Possible
constitutional objections to the differential tax credit proposal are
also discussed.
While there are various technical errors and gaps in analysis, the
7. Id. at 72.
8. These socio-economic differences, measured in terms of socio-
economic scores, refers to an index based on such variables as median
income, occupational, and educational levels.
9. Id.
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most serious problem is with the general principles underlying their
approach. The essence of the authors' program rests on the assump-
tion of the existence of an effective trickle-down mechanism: if we
aid business and affluent individuals, all of society will be the ulti-
mate beneficiary. Specifically, they assume that the multiplier ef-
fect on the city tax base will somehow filter down and release the
poor from their relative and absolute deprivation. At the very least,
the authors assert that this use of tax incentives will foster socially
and racially integrated cities.
The problem with this assumption is the lack of evidence that the
expected results will actually occur. Can we rely solely on "eco-
nomic self-interest" for a few hundred dollars tax credit to distract
people from their fears of crime and social unrest and their aversion
to noise, pollution, and congestion? What reason have we to believe
that such tax credits, even if they were high enough to serve as a
"holding action," will create socially and racially integrated com-
munities? Is there any basis to believe that municipal governments
have the power, expertise, and political determination to utilize
additional resources effectively in the solution of complex social
problems? Experience with previous urban programs does not gen-
erate optimism on any of these questions.
It is evident that the major consequence of the tax credit program
would be to increase the tax base of our depressed central cities-a
necessary and perhaps critical need. Yet the authors do not convinc-
ingly demonstrate that the cities are capable of grappling with the
social and economic realities of a society which clings to economic
and racial separation. Neither do they dwell on the relative advan-
tages of programs which might provide greater opportunities and
effective choices to the poor through a guaranteed annual income
and the opening up of the suburbs to all income, racial, and ethnic
groups. Admittedly the political climate for any or all of these pro-
posals is inhospitable, but the urban incentive tax credit does not
appear to be a promising alternative.
Phillip Weitzman*
*Assistant Professor of Economics, Herbert H. Lehman College, City
University of New York.
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HEROIN ADDICTION IN BRITAIN-WHAT AMERICANS
CAN LEARN FROM THE ENGLISH EXPERIENCE. By Horace
Freeland Judson. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1974.
Pp. xii, 200. $6.95
Though often misunderstood and misrepresented, the British
experience with heroin maintenance' is cited as support by both
proponents and opponents of heroin maintenance in the United
States. For those who favor heroin maintenance, the British system
is clear proof that heroin can be distributed to addicts without caus-
ing an epidemic. For those who oppose heroin maintenance, the
British system is equally persuasive that legal heroin distribution
does not stem the rise of addiction. Amidst all this debate, Horace
Judson's book, Heroin Addiction in Britain,' comes as a welcome
addition to the literature. In clear, readable prose, the author takes
us step by step through the history of British heroin mainte-
nance-trying to separate myth from reality, misconception from
truth. Any history of British drug policy must emphasize the im-
portance of the famous Rolleston Committee Report of 1924. After
extensive investigation, the Committee concluded that doctors
must be permitted to prescribe and administer heroin or morphine
to confirmed addicts under certain circumstances. From that base
point, Judson carefully follows the events of the next forty years,
culminating in the 1964 report of the Second Brain Committee-a
report which modified the initial Rolleston approach in some signifi-
cant measure. Now only doctors at designated drug clinics would be
permitted to administer drugs to addicts.
Has this British "clinic" system of dispensing heroin to proven
addicts led to decreased levels of addiction? Mr. Judson's book does
not fully answer the question but it does demonstrate one
point-and that forcefully: heroin maintenance in Britain has not
1. Great Britain has clinics where addicts can legally obtain heroin or
morphine. "Underlying the British approach is the belief that narcotic
dependence is a medical problem to be treated by medical professionals
rather than a criminal problem to be handled by law enforcement agents."
NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE FOR DRUG ABUSE INFORMATION, REP. SERIES 13,
No. 1, at 1 (Apr. 1973).
2. H. JUDSON, HEROIN ADDICTION IN BRITAIN-WHAT AMERICANS CAN
LEARN FROM THE ENGLISH EXPERIENCE (1974).
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
led to a heroin epidemic. On the contrary, the figures for known
British heroin addicts are astoundingly low both in terms of abso-
lute numbers and in terms of per cent of the population.' What is
even more surprising-unbelievable some might say-is that the
number of heroin addicts has remained fairly constant over the past
several years.'
If the book is incisive in its treatment of the British approach to
heroin control, it is equally trenchant in its reporting of the British
reaction to American drug control policy. Several aspects of this
reaction are quite interesting. First, the British are struck by the
sense of fear that pervades America's reaction to narcotics in general
and to heroin in particular. Fear obviously is not conducive to bal-
anced policy decisions. Although indefensible, the American reac-
tion to drugs is understandable when viewed in its historical con-
text. For example, for over one hundred years the popular American
mythology about drugs has tended to be overlaid with racial and
other xenophobic feelings. It was the unpopular Chinese coolies who
first experimented with opium in the West. Since the Chinese coolie
was alien to the majority of Americans, since he ultimately became
an economic threat because he would work for less wages, any aspect
of his life became suspect. As a consequence, opium use became
associated with the general unpopularity of Chinese immigrant
labor. In later years "sporting characters"-gamblers and the
like-began to experiment with opium. Drug use now became asso-
ciated with these aberrant life styles. At the turn of the century, the
sudden cocaine paranoia in America may have stemmed in part
from reports of heavy Negro cocaine use in the South. There were
rumors that the drug could make one violent-fears of crime and
race became intertwined with drug use for a second time. The same
current of public opinion continued up to the 1960s as the "hippie
movement," an unpopular life style at that time, became associated
in the public mind with drug use. Once there is public disapproval
of a group of people, how they look, what they stand for, and what
they distinctively eat or smoke tend to be clothed with the same
3. The most recent survey, in 1972, "counted 1,619 narcotics addicts
in Britain. In Washington, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
estimated in January 1973 that there were 626,000 heroin addicts in the
United States .... " Id. at 11.
4. Id. at 159.
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disapproval. In this same sense drugs have not become associated
with unpopular groups or life styles in Britain-at least to the extent
they have here. Consequently, a wider range of policy alternatives
are more politically feasible in Britain. Unreasonable fears about
drugs and subconscious associations of drugs with unpopular groups
all tend to restrict the range of policy alternatives in the United
States.
In addition to being surprised by America's fear of drugs, British
drug experts are also astounded by the amounts of money spent
every year attempting to solve the problem. Billions of dollars of
public and private funds are being spent to cure drug addiction. One
British doctor is quoted as saying: "One of the statistics we were
told [at a certain conference] was that, currently, for every Ameri-
can addict in any kind of treatment, there are two staff receiving
salary."5 Unfortunately this may be all too true a statement. Apart
from government moneys being spent on drug law enforcement,
apart from the countless government research grants given academ-
ics every year, entire industries have begun to grow up around the
drug cure business-methadone clinics staffed by private physi-
cians have become a booming business, drug analysis and urinalysis
centers have sprung up to serve their needs, and private drug re-
search firms have been created. Like the fabled "military-
industrial" complex of the Eisenhower years, a "drug abuse-
industrial complex" has been created. Once created, it is hard to
dismantle. To put it another way, with so much money at stake,
there is an incentive not to let the problem die or at least there is
an incentive to push for one's own special treatment modality. The
law enforcers want to keep their funds, so they push for new law
enforcement programs to end the heroin traffic; the methadone
maintenance advocates push for more money for more centers; soci-
ologists and psychologists request further grants to test this or that
theory of addiction. Quite often some of these diverse elements of
the "drug abuse-industrial complex" lobby against new alternatives
simply to prevent money from being siphoned off to fund new pro-
grams or approaches. Fiscal preservation is an age-old vice of man.
If Mr. Judson's book has any fault, it is the brief treatment given
to the moral issues surrounding drug maintenance. For example, is
5. Id. at 125.
19751
422 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. III
it a right and humane thing for society to stabilize juveniles on
drugs or should society instead concentrate on drug-free cures? Why
does society reject state-supported maintenance for alcoholics but
accept state-supported maintenance for drug addicts? These are
some of the basic questions-questions which are not adequately
analyzed in this otherwise excellent reportorial analysis of the Bri-
tish heroin system. Perhaps Mr. Judson or someone else will address
such problems in the future.
Gerald T. McLaughlin*
*Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.
